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ABSTRACT 
Maya G. Mosner: Social and Nonsocial Effort-Based Decision-Making in Adolescents with 
Autism Spectrum Disorders 
(Under the direction of Gabriel S. Dichter) 
 
There has been recent emphasis on addressing the impact of motivational factors on 
social deficits in Autism spectrum disorders (ASD). The present investigation evaluated effort-
based decision-making in social and nonsocial contexts to examine one aspect of social 
motivation in ASD. To downward extend prior findings of impaired effort-expenditure in adults 
with ASD, the current study explored effort-based decision-making in adolescents with ASD and 
typically developing adolescents. Using the Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task (EEfRT), 
participants made choices to win money for themselves or to win money for another person. 
Contrary to previous findings, when choosing for themselves, the ASD group exhibited similar 
effort-expenditure across reward parameters compared to typical adolescents. However, when 
choosing for another person, the ASD group demonstrated decreased sensitivity to reward 
magnitude. These findings provide support for atypical social effort-based decision-making in 
this population and highlight the importance of exploring developmental patterns of reward 
processing in ASD.  
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SOCIAL AND NONSOCIAL EFFORT-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN 
ADOLESCENTS WITH AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS 
 
Since Leo Kanner’s (1943) seminal paper that described children with “autistic 
disturbances of affective contact,” impairments in social communication have been 
conceptualized as a core deficit of autism spectrum disorders (ASD; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Current definitions of ASD continue to emphasize social communication 
deficits, which have been shown to encompass impairments in certain domains of social 
cognition, including difficulties with social attention, joint attention, and theory of mind (ToM). 
For example, deficits in eye contact are a diagnostic feature of ASD and indices of eye contact 
are included in many ASD diagnostic instruments (i.e. the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule, ADOS; Lord et al., 2000). Within the first six months of infancy, individuals later 
diagnosed with ASD exhibit diminished attention to the eyes of others (Jones & Klin, 2013). 
Studies examining early home videos of children have shown that those later diagnosed with 
ASD are significantly less likely to respond to their name or look at people than are typically-
developing counterparts (Baranek, 1999; Werner, Dawson, Osterling, & Dinno, 2000). 
Additionally, social communications deficits include impairments in response to, and initiation 
of, joint attention, and the ability to coordinate visual attention with a social partner, have been 
repeatedly found in infants with ASD (Dawson et al., 2004; Mundy, Sullivan, & Mastergeorge, 
2009; Naber et al., 2008). Furthermore, children with ASD have impaired ToM, the ability to 
attribute mental states to others (also known as mentalizing), and as a result, have difficulty 
attaching appropriate emotions and mental states to photos of eyes, voices, and social contexts in 
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stories and films (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Golan, Baron-Cohen, 
& Golan, 2008; White, Hill, Happe, & Frith, 2009).  
The Social Motivation Hypothesis of Autism 
Despite extensive data that indicate social communication deficits in ASD, recent 
evidence highlights the influence of motivational factors in social communication abilities in 
ASD. That is, it appears that deficits in social motivation may contribute to social 
communication impairments in ASD such that, under certain motivational conditions, certain 
social cognitive abilities, such as difficulties solving ToM tasks and recognizing basic facial 
expressions, may not be impaired in ASD (Chevallier, Kohls, et al., 2012; Lahaie et al., 2006; 
Wang, Dapretto, Hariri, Sigman, & Bookheimer, 2004). Chevallier and colleagues (2012) 
theorized that social motivation plays an important role in social communication abilities, 
leading to the development of the “social motivation hypothesis of autism.” This framework is a 
complementary model to existing theories of social cognition and posits that early-emerging 
disruptions in social motivation may be a primary deficit in ASD, with downstream effects on 
the development of social communicative skills (Chevallier, Kohls, et al., 2012; Dawson et al., 
2004). According to this model, social motivation is defined as psychological dispositions and 
biological mechanisms that increase motivation to orient to the social world (social orienting), to 
take pleasure from social interactions (social reward), and to work to gain and maintain social 
relationships (social maintaining), each of which has been shown to be disrupted in individuals 
with ASD (Chevallier, Grezes, Molesworth, Berthoz, & Happe, 2012; Chevallier, Kohls, et al., 
2012; Sasson & Touchstone, 2014). 
Individuals with ASD often exhibit decreased social orienting and social interest during 
the first year of life, as previously mentioned, in the form of diminished eye contact and 
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infrequent orienting to one’s own name (Dawson, Bernier, & Ring, 2012). Additionally, 
individuals with ASD tend to show these deficits from infancy that persists through early 
childhood, which can impede the development of social functioning. For instance, compared 
with typical peers, children with ASD reported less enjoyment in social situations, and social 
enjoyment in this sample was correlated with diminished flattery behavior (Chevallier, Grezes, et 
al., 2012). These classic deficits can be conceptualized as a reflection of social cognitive deficits 
or alternatively, as social cognitive deficits resulting from decreased pleasure from social stimuli 
and/or contexts (“reward liking”), as well as diminished anticipation of social rewards (“reward 
wanting”) (Chevallier, Kohls, et al., 2012; Dichter et al., 2012).  
The Current Study   
To better understand the influence of social motivation deficits on social impairments in 
ASD and how these deficits interact, paradigms are needed that are capable of teasing these two 
constructs apart. Most studies of ASD have examined social cognition and social motivation 
separately, proposing that early impairments in social motivation can lead to social cognition 
deficits throughout development (Chevallier et al., 2014; Schultz, 2005).  To date, only two 
studies have concurrently assessed social motivation and social cognition in ASD. Chevallier and 
colleagues (2014) found that, due to diminished sensitivity to the presence of others (reduced 
social motivation), children with ASD demonstrated ToM deficits only when the ToM task was 
administered by a human rather than by a computer. Peterson and colleagues (2013) 
demonstrated that adequate incentives boosted motivation and, as a result, improved 
performance on a ToM task in children with ASD. These results demonstrate that motivational 
processes influence social cognition skills. 
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The purpose of the present investigation was to evaluate effort-based decision-making in 
social and nonsocial contexts as a means to address one aspect of the social motivation 
hypothesis of ASD. Animal studies have demonstrated a “law of least effort”, namely that 
animals choose to exert the least amount of effort necessary to obtain a reward; however, when 
reward preferences increase, due to reward magnitude for instance, the animal will exert more 
effort to obtain such a reward (Salamone, 2006; Solomon, 1948). Factors influencing effort 
exertion include: perceived effort required, valuation of potential rewards, and the probability 
that the reward will be received if the animal is successful at completing the task (Salamone, 
2006). Further, dopaminergic activity in the ventral striatum (and more specifically, the nucleus 
accumbens) mediates how behavioral choices are influenced by expected reward value and effort 
expenditure (Salamone, Correa, Farrar, & Mingote, 2007). Therefore, effort-based decision-
making paradigms are designed to measure motivation for reward based on how much effort is 
exerted to obtain a reward of a given magnitude. The Expenditure for Rewards Task (EEfRT) 
was created as a task sensitive to these motivational processes and to mimic these classic 
preclinical behavioral tasks that assay behavioral output of the mesolimbic dopaminergic system 
(Treadway et al., 2009; Treadway & Zald, 2011). 
Recent studies have used the EEfRT to examine motivational processes in nonclinical 
and clinical populations. EEfRT performance is modulated by the administration of d-
amphetamine, a dopamine agonist, such that it enhanced willingness to exert effort in healthy 
participants (Wardle, Treadway, Mayo, Zald, & de Wit, 2011). In clinical research, individuals 
with anhedonia as well as individuals with major depressive disorder (MDD) showed decreased 
sensitivity to (that is, motivation for) rewards on the EEfRT, consistent with preclinical models 
linking anhedonia to decreased mesolimbic dopamine function (Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, & 
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Zald, 2012; Treadway et al., 2009). Most recently, the EEfRT was found to be a valid and 
reliable measure of effort expenditure for rewards in individuals with schizophrenia (Reddy et 
al., 2015). 
Our research group previously used the EEfRT to measure effort-based decision-making 
in adults with ASD. Damiano et al. (2012) found altered patterns of effort-based decision-
making in ASD characterized by more hard task choices to expend effort to obtain rewards and 
an insensitivity to the magnitude or probability of the reward relative to expended effort. These 
results suggest hyperactive behavioral output of the mesolimbic dopamine system in individuals 
with ASD and provide further evidence that individuals with ASD display atypical patterns of 
effort-based motivation for rewards. In the present study, we sought to downward extend these 
findings to adolescents with ASD. Additionally, to address both social motivation and social 
cognition, the present study used a modified version of the EEfRT that includes social and 
nonsocial conditions in adolescents 12-20 years old and age- and gender-matched typically 
developing controls (TDC). Specifically, the task included conditions where participants worked 
toward earning rewards for themselves (“Self”) or another study participant (“Other”).  
Based on findings of Damiano et al. (2012), primary hypotheses predicted that, in the 
Self condition, adolescents with ASD would select the hard task option more often than would 
the TDC group. Furthermore, given that ASD is characterized by deficits in prosocial behaviors 
(Dawson et al., 2012), in the Other condition, I hypothesized more pronounced deficits in in the 
ASD group indicated by fewer hard task choices relative to the TDC group. To address whether 
these impairments are separable from impairments in social cognition, a subset of participants 
completed a ToM assessment to address the degree to which differences in effort-based decision-
making are potentially accounted for by impairments in ToM.  I hypothesized that differences in 
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the proportion of hard task choices would not be accounted for by ToM deficits. Finally, linkages 
between effort-based decision-making and symptom severity, as well as dimensions of affect and 
reward sensitivity, were explored. I hypothesized that patterns of effort-based decision-making in 
the ASD group would predict more severe core autism symptoms and more severe impairments 
in associated measures of affective and reward sensitivity. 
Methods 
The biomedical institutional review board reviewed and approved this study and data 
collection is complete.  
Participants 
Fifty adolescents with ASD and 32 TDCs ranging in age from 12-20 years participated in 
this study. All participants with ASD were high functioning, defined as having fluent phrase 
speech and a nonverbal IQ>70. Groups were matched on chronological age. Across both groups, 
inclusion criteria included: no known sensory deficits or diagnosis of intellectual disability. 
Additional inclusion criteria for the ASD group included: an established clinical diagnosis 
corroborated by the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, Second Edition (ADOS-2). 
Additional inclusion criteria for the TDC group included: no current or history of diagnosis of 
ASD or other Axis I diagnoses assessed via the MINI International Neuropsychiatric Interview 
(MINI), self-report and MINI for Children and Adolescents (MINI-KID-P).  
The ASD and TDC groups did not differ in age, t(80)= 0.64, p = 0.53 (see Table 1). 
Groups did differ in Verbal Intelligence Quotient (VIQ), (t(79)=2.43, p=0.02) and Full Scale IQ 
(FSIQ), (t(79)=2.37, p=0.02), but not on Performance IQ (PIQ), (t(79)=1.72, p=0.09). Groups 
also differed in terms of gender ratio (t(47)= 3.16, p<0.01), such that there were significantly 
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more females in the TDC group than in the ASD group. Findings from the MINI and MINI-KID-
P revealed that 68% (n=34) of the ASD group met criteria for at least one comorbid disorder.  
Recruitment  
Participants with ASD were recruited via the UNC Autism Research Registry, a resource 
at the Carolina Institute for Developmental Disabilities (CIDD). A mailing and brochure was 
distributed to individuals identified by the Registry personnel and participants responded if 
interested. If this was the case, their contact information was passed along only to the research 
team. Recruitment of typically developing adults (>18) took place via mass email to UNC-
Chapel Hill employees and students. I recruited typically developing adolescents (<18) via the 
CIDD Child Development Registry (http://www.cidd.unc.edu/Registry/researchers/default.aspx). 
Once interest was determined and contact information obtained, a member of the research team 
contacted the participant (or parent) via phone or email to schedule the appointment.  
Procedure 
For both groups (ASD and TDC), the study included a 2-4 hour testing session at the 
CIDD located in Carrboro, NC. Prior to participation, consent was obtained from all parents and 
adolescents over 18 years of age and assent was obtained from adolescents younger than 18 
years. Following consent, the EEfRT task, diagnostic and symptom assessments, and cognitive 
test were conducted. Demographic information was also collected. The EEfRT task and 
symptom questionnaires were completed on a computer, the former administered using MatLab 
software, and the latter using Qualtrics survey software. Graduate and undergraduate research 
assistants administered diagnostic and cognitive tests under the supervision of the Principal 
Investigator, Dr. Gabriel Dichter, an experienced clinical psychologist and diagnostician. As 
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compensation, participants received $10 per hour, $10 for completion of the computer task, and 
an additional $2.00-8.66 earned during the behavioral task. 
Materials and Measures 
Effort-based decision-making task. The primary goal of the central study was to 
examine effort-based decision-making in adolescents with ASD in social and nonsocial contexts. 
Participants completed a modified version of the Effort-Expenditure for Rewards Task (EEfRT; 
Damiano et al., 2012; Treadway et al., 2009; Treadway & Zald, 2011), the “Self vs. Other” 
EEfRT, which was created by collaborator Dr. Michael Treadway who developed the original 
EEfRT. During one block of trials, participants were making decisions about rewards for 
themselves (“Self”), and during the other block of trials they were making decisions about 
rewards for someone else (“Other”) (see Figure 1).  
The EEfRT task is a multi-trial game in which participants were given an opportunity on 
each trial to choose between two different task difficulty levels in order to obtain rewards. For all 
trials, participants made repeated manual button presses within a short period of time. Each 
button press raised the level of a virtual “bar” displayed. Participants were eligible to win money 
during each trial if they raise the bar to the “top” within the given time period. Each trial 
presented the participant with a choice between two levels of task difficulty, a “hard task” and an 
“easy task.” Successful completion of hard task trials required the participant to make 100 button 
presses within 21 seconds, using his/her non-dominant pinky finger, while successful completion 
of easy-task trials required the participant to make 30 button presses within seven seconds, using 
his/her dominant index finger.  
For easy-task trials, participants were eligible to win the same amount, $1.00, on each 
trial, if they successfully completed the task (raised the bar to the top). For hard task choices, 
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participants were eligible to win greater amounts that varied per trial within a range of $1.24 – 
$4.30 (“reward magnitude”). There were three levels of magnitude: small magnitude was defined 
as any value between $1.24 and $2.00; medium magnitude included values between $2.01 and 
$3.00; and large magnitude included values between $3.01 and $4.12. Additionally, participants 
were not guaranteed to win the reward if they completed the task; some trials were “win” trials, 
in which the participant received the stated reward amount, while others were “no win” trials, in 
which the participant received no money for that trial. To help them determine which trials were 
more likely to be win trials, participants were provided with accurate probability cues at the 
beginning of each trial (“reward probability”). There were three levels of probability: “high” 
88% probability of being a win trial, “medium” 50% and “low” 12%. These levels always 
applied to both the hard task and easy task, and there were equal proportions of each probability 
level across the experiment. Each level of probability appeared once along with each level of 
reward value for the hard task (Treadway et al., 2009). Both reward magnitude and reward 
probability have been shown to influence nucleus accumbens dopamine release during reward 
anticipation, especially during high uncertainty (50%) and high reward magnitude trials (Fiorillo, 
Tobler, & Schultz, 2003; Schultz, 2002). Furthermore, at the beginning of each trial and prior to 
receiving information about reward magnitude and probability, participants were told whether or 
not they would be earning money for themselves or for an imaginary “other” person whom they 
had not met (the next participant in the study). They were also informed that a previous 
participant already earned money for them. Trials were presented in the same randomized order 
for every participant.  
In addition, participants were told that two of their win trials would be randomly selected 
at the end of the experiment as “incentive trials” for which they would receive the actual amount 
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of money won during those trials. Participants were informed that the task takes approximately 
twenty minutes. Given that hard task trials take approximately twice as much time to complete as 
easy-task trials, the number of trials completed depended in part on the choices that the 
participant made. Therefore, making more hard task choices at the beginning of the experiment 
could reduce the total number of trials, which could mean that the participant would not get a 
chance to play high value, high-probability trials that might appear towards the end of the 
playing time. This trade-off was meant to ensure that neither a strategy of always choosing the 
easy nor the hard option could lead to an “optimal” performance on the task.  
All trials began with information regarding whether participants were “choosing for self” 
or “choosing for other” for the given trial. This was followed by a one-second fixation cross, 
then a choice period in which participants were given information regarding the reward 
magnitude of the hard task and the probability of receiving reward. The unlimited choice period 
was modified from the original version of the EEfRT in order to accommodate potential slower 
processing speeds in the ASD group (Damiano et al., 2012). After making a choice, participants 
were then shown a one-second “Ready” screen after which they completed the task. Following 
task completion, participants were shown a two-second feedback screen informing them whether 
the task was successfully or unsuccessfully completed. If participants successfully completed the 
task, a second feedback screen appeared for two seconds in which they were told whether they 
won money for that trial (reward feedback). In total, easy-task trials took approximately 15 
seconds while hard task trials took approximately 30 seconds. 
The dependent variable (willingness to expend effort for rewards) was the percentage of 
times the hard task was chosen for both Self and Other conditions. The money a participant 
could win ranged from $2.00 to $8.66. Participants were informed that they would earn a base 
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rate of $10 for completing the task, plus any additional money that they might “win” during the 
task. Thus, participants could receive $12.00-$18.66 for completing this portion of the task.  
Diagnostic Assessments. ASD participants were given a gold-standard diagnostic tool, 
the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, Second Edition (ADOS-2) to confirm ASD 
diagnoses (Lord et al., 2012). The ADOS was conducted by a research reliable assessor 
supervised by Dr. Dichter, a licensed psychologist. Modules 3 and 4 of the ADOS-2 were used, 
as they are designed for verbally fluent children and adolescents, respectively. The difference 
between the modules lies primarily in whether information about social communication is 
necessary during play or through a conversational interview; adolescents may feel uncomfortable 
or uninterested in playing with toys such as action figures. Each module includes 10-15 
activities, with 29-31 accompanying ratings. Standard algorithm cutoffs for ASD were met on 
the ADOS-2. 
To assess for past or present Axis I psychopathology, all participants completed either the 
MINI International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI) or the MINI for Children and 
Adolescents (MINI-KID-P). The MINI is a semi-structured clinical diagnostic interview that 
evaluates the presence of current DSM-IV and ICD-10 psychiatric disorders in adults; the MINI-
KID-P evaluates the presence of these disorders in children and adolescents ages 6-17 via parent 
interview (Sheehan et al., 1998; Sheehan et al., 2010). The MINI and MINI-KIP-P have yet to be 
validated in an ASD sample; however, there is no gold standard tool to assess comorbid 
diagnoses in ASD. Previous studies have employed the Kiddie Schedule for Affective Disorders 
and Schizophrenia (K-SADS; Leyfer et al., 2006) and the Autism Comorbidity Interview-Present 
and Lifetime Version (ACI; Mazefsky et al., 2012), neither of which have been validated in ASD 
and the latter of which is still in development and the manual is not available. For the current 
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study, the goal was to use the same instrument across all participants while considering 
participant burden. Therefore, I chose the MINI and the MINI-KID-P because it is brief and has 
concordant validity with the K-SADS (Sheehan et al., 2010). 
 Cognitive Assessment. Intellectual functioning was assessed using the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) or the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test, Second 
Edition (KBIT-II). The WASI is a reliable measure of intelligence that comprises of four 
subtests: Vocabulary, Similarities, Block Design, and Matrix Reasoning. The KBIT-2 is a 
reliable measure of intelligence that comprises of three subtests: Verbal Knowledge, Matrices, 
and Riddles. Both tests can be administered in just 30 minutes and produce scores for Verbal 
Intelligence Quotient (VIQ), Performance IQ (PIQ), and Full Scale IQ (FIQ). The WASI is in 
concordance with the full Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WASI; Axelrod, 2002) and the 
KBIT-2 is in concordance with the full Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children (KABC-II; 
Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004). Both have been used in ASD samples (Bardikoff & McGonigle-
Chalmers, 2014; Damiano et al., 2012).  
ASD Symptom and Associated Measures. Symptom severity, affective functioning, and 
reward sensitivity were assessed with self- and caregiver-report measures (see Table 2).  
Core Autism Symptoms. The Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS) is a self-report 
instrument that provides a dimensional measure of autism impairments. The 65-item rating scale 
measures the severity of social-communicative autism symptoms as they occur in natural social 
settings (Constantino et al., 2003). Participants responded on a four-point Likert scale, 
representing a range from “not true” to “almost always true.” T scores from 60-75 are considered 
to be in the mild to moderate range while scores above 76 are considered to be in the severe 
range. The self-report version of the SRS (SRS-SR) was completed by adult participants (18-20 
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year olds); caregivers completed the caregiver-report version of the SRS (SRS-CR) for 
participants younger than 18 years old.  
Theory of mind. Theory of mind (ToM) was assessed using several first- and second-
order ToM tasks. The first ToM task was the Sally-Anne task, a first-order ToM task that has 
been used to demonstrate impaired ToM in individuals with ASD (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 
1985; Holroyd & Baron-Cohen, 1993; Surian & Leslie, 1999). The other two second-order ToM 
tasks included the Puppy Story and Prisoner Story (Happe, 1994; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 
1994). The Prisoner Story was administered first and only if participants failed to correctly 
respond to this first task were the Puppy Story and Sally-Anne task administered subsequently.  
Anhedonia and Reward. The Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (TEPS) measures, 
on a scale of 1 to 5, how true a particular statement is for an individual, with 1 being “very false” 
and 5 being “very true.” Such statements include “I appreciate the beauty of a fresh snowfall” 
and “When something is coming up in my life, I really look forward to it” (Gard, Gard, Kring, & 
John, 2006). The measure comprises of nine items for each of two scales, consummatory 
pleasure and anticipatory pleasure, and was administered to all participants with and without 
ASD. Total scores were generated for the two subscales with higher scores indicating greater 
levels of pleasure. 
The Apathy Evaluation Scale (AES) was designed to provide global measures of apathy. 
The measure treats apathy as a psychological dimension defined by simultaneous deficits in the 
overt behavioral, cognitive, and emotional concomitants of goal-directed behavior (Marin, 
Biedrzycki, & Firinciogullari, 1991). Response options include: (1) “not at all;” (2) “slightly;” 
(3) “somewhat;” and (4) “a lot.” A total score was generated with higher scores indicating 
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greater levels of apathy. This measure was administered to both groups, including a separate 
report for male and female participants as well as a self-report and caregiver report.  
The Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire (SPSRQ) is a 
response item questionnaire with 48 yes/no items comprising 24 items for each of two scales: 
sensitivity to punishment (SP) and sensitivity to reward (SR; Torrubia, Avila, Molto, & Caseras, 
2001). For the purposes of the current study, only the sensitivity to reward subscale was 
analyzed, with higher scores indicating greater sensitivity to reward. For both groups, 18-20 
year-old participants filled out the self-report version (SPSRQ-SR) and parents filled out the 
caregiver-report version (SPSRQ-CR).  
The Behavioral Inhibition Scale (BIS) evaluates aspects of anticipation of punishment 
(Carver & White, 1994) and is made up of seven items as part of the full Behavioral Inhibition 
Scale and Behavioral Activation Scale (BIS/BAS). Participants respond on a scale of 1 to 4, 
representing a range from “I do not agree at all” to “I totally agree.” The Child BIS/BAS (C-
BIS/BAS) is a semi-structured interview that has been modified for parent/caregiver report in 
which parents respond on a scale of 1 to 7, ranging from “extremely true” to “extremely untrue” 
regarding child. The C-BIS/BAS helps to create a more comprehensive picture of the child’s 
everyday behavior and symptoms (Blair, Peters, & Granger, 2004). Both the BIS/BAS and C-
BIS/BAS were administered to both groups.  
Affective Functioning. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) measure comprises 21 
questions that ask an individual to describe his/her feelings over the past few days. Each question 
includes four possible answer choices related to mood; answer choices range from 0 to 3. For 
example, an individual may select 0, “My appetite is no worse than usual” or 3, “I have no 
appetite at all anymore” for a question relating to appetite (Beck & Steer, 1984). This measure 
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was administered to 18-20 year-old adolescents with and without ASD. The research assistant 
checked this measure immediately following administration. In the highly unlikely event that the 
respondent indicated a desire to harm him/herself, Dr. Dichter, the PI of this protocol, was called 
to evaluate whether referral to a treatment provider or the emergency room would be 
appropriate. A total of 10 participants indicated passive suicidal ideation over the course of the 
study, though no imminent risk or active ideation was ever determined. Similarly, the Child 
Depression Inventory (CDI) comprises 28 items, each of which includes three statements to 
evaluate the presence and severity of specific depressive symptoms in individuals between the 
ages of 7 and 17. For each item, the participant is asked to select the statement that best describes 
his/her feelings (Helsel & Matson, 1984). This measure was administered to adolescents (ages 
12-17) with and without autism. 
The Behavioral Activation Scale (BAS) items, part of the BIS/BAS, are designed to 
evaluate aspects of behavior such as reward responsiveness (five items), drive (or persistent 
pursuit of goals; four items), and fun seeking behaviors (four items) (Carver & White, 1994). 
The C-BIS/BAS includes similar sub-scales (Blair et al., 2004).  
Development. The Peterson Pubertal Development Scale (PPDS) is an informant-based 
measure, which asks parents to use five indices to report the degree to which their children have 
advanced through age-dependent physical development and the normative behavioral changes 
that accompany this stage (Petersen, Crockett, Richards, & Boxer, 1988). Specifically, caregivers 
are asked about growth, body hair, and skin changes (especially pimples). Males are asked about 
changes to voice and growth of facial hair, and females are asked about breast development. 
Response options include: (1) “not yet started;” (2) “barely started;” (3) “definitely started;” and 
(4) “seems complete.” In addition, females are asked about onset and age of menstruation. This 
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form was filled out only by parents of adolescents ages 12-17. A total score was generated with 
higher scores indicating greater degrees of development. 
Data Analytic Plan 
A priori hypotheses investigated whether the ASD group differed compared to the TDC 
group on their willingness to expend effort to obtain uncertain rewards for Self and rewards for 
Other. As such, the primary analysis was an omnibus 2 (Group: ASD, TDC) × 3 (Magnitude: 
Small, Medium, Large) × 3 (Probability: Low (12%), Medium (50%), High (88%)) × 2 
(Condition: Self, Other) repeated measures analysis of variances on the percentage of hard task 
choices. I considered using Self-Other difference scores that would reflect the bias to make hard 
task choices for Self versus Other; however, because difference scores obscure whether effects 
are driven by aberrant scores on one dimension or the other, difference scores were not used. 
Follow-up analyses examined between- and within-group differences within and across each 
level of Magnitude and Probability for Self and Other conditions separately. Age and IQ were 
not covaried in the primary analysis (1) to allow for a direct comparison with results from adults 
with ASD in Damiano et al. (2012), and (2) because there are no published data documenting 
relationships between gender and IQ and EEfRT performance. Results with these covariates, as 
well as pubertal development (PPDS total score), are reported in supplementary analyses (see 
Appendix). 
I intended to include ToM as a covariate in primary analyses to address the contribution 
of ToM deficits to effort-based decision-making. However, initial analyses revealed, 
surprisingly, that groups did not differ in this ToM measure (see Table 3), indicating that this 
measure did not adequately capture ToM deficits in this sample. Therefore, ToM was not 
included in the primary analysis but results with this covariate are reported in supplementary 
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analyses (see Appendix). Lastly, supplementary analyses also include an examination of results 
excluding participants with comorbid diagnoses.  
Correlational analyses examined relationships between effort-based decision-making and 
ASD symptoms as well as affective and reward sensitivity in the ASD group. Specifically, I 
examined the relationship between the percentage of hard task choices and scores from the 
following measures: SRS, CDI or BDI, SPSRQ (Reward subscale only), TEPS (Anticipatory and 
Consummatory subscales), BIS/BAS or C-BIS/BAS (BIS, BAS-Drive, BAS-Fun Seeking, and 
BAS-Reward Responsiveness subscales), the AES, and ToM. To more fully explore patterns in 
the data, these analyses were not corrected for multiple comparisons. 
Results 
Symptom and Dimensional Measures 
Not surprisingly, groups significantly differed on the SRS, t(80)=12.40, p<.0001, with 
greater ASD symptoms reported in the ASD group compared to the TDC group. Importantly, the 
mean t-score for the TDC group fell within the normal range while the mean t-score for the ASD 
group fell above the clinical cut off (within the severe range). Groups also significantly differed 
on the TEPS Consummatory subscale, t(80)=2.38, p=.02, with lower ratings of consummatory 
pleasure reported in the ASD group compared to the TDC group. Lastly, groups significantly 
differed on the AES, t(77)=6.41, p<.0001, such that the ASD group reported lower levels of 
apathy compared to the TDC group. Additionally, of the 27 participants who were administered 
the ToM tasks, 71% of the ASD group compared with 85% of the TDC group correctly 
completed the highest-order task, though there was no significant difference between groups, 
t(25)=0.80, p=.43. See Table 3 for summary statistics for all measures. 
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Primary Analysis 
The omnibus model was a 2 (Group: ASD, TDC) × 3 (Magnitude: Small, Medium, 
Large) × 3 (Probability: Low, Medium, High) × 2 (Condition: Self, Other) repeated measures 
ANOVA performed on the percentage of hard task choices. Centrally relevant to hypotheses, this 
model revealed a significant Condition × Group × Magnitude interaction, F(2,79)=3.79, p=.03, 
reflecting that groups differed on the influence of Magnitude in the Self relative to the Other 
condition, as well as a significant Condition × Group interaction, F(1,80)=3.88, p=.05, indicating 
that groups differed in overall responses for Self and Other.   
Additionally, there was a significant Condition × Magnitude × Probability interaction, 
F(2,79)=3.99, p=.005 and a significant main effect of Condition, F(2,79)=33.25, p<.0001, 
reflecting a greater percentage of hard task choices in the Self relative to the Other condition 
across groups. Not surprisingly, there was a significant main effect for Magnitude with higher 
magnitude levels associated with more hard task choices across groups, F(2,79)=47.83, p<.0001, 
and a significant main effect for Probability with higher probability levels associated with more 
hard task choices, F(2,79)=60.25, p<.0001 across groups. All other main effects and interactions 
were not significant.  
Follow-up Between-group analyses. Between-group t tests between levels of Magnitude 
for Self collapsing across Probability revealed no significant group differences at the Small 
(t(80)=0.03, p=.98) or Large magnitudes (t(80)=0.44, p=.66). At the Medium magnitude level, 
there was a significant trend, t(80)= 1.91, p=0.06, with a greater proportion of hard task choices 
in the TDC group compared to the ASD group (see Figure 2). Between-group t tests between 
levels of Magnitude for Other collapsing across Probability revealed no significant group 
differences at the Medium (t(80)=1.30, p=.20) or Large magnitudes (t(80)= 0.43, p=.67). At the 
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Small magnitude level, there was a significant trend, t(80)=1.81, p=0.07, with a greater 
proportion of hard task choices in the ASD group compared to the TDC group (see Figure 2). 
Between-group t tests between levels of Probability for Self collapsing across Magnitude 
revealed no significant group differences at the Low (t(80)=0.13, p=.90) or Medium probabilities 
(t(80)=0.51, p=.61). At the High probability level, there was significant difference between 
groups, t(79)=2.04, p=0.04, indicating fewer hard task choices in the ASD group compared to the 
TDC group (see Figure 3). Between-group t tests between levels of Probability for Other 
collapsing across Magnitude revealed no significant group differences at the Medium 
(t(80)=0.81, p=.42) or High probabilities (t(80)=0.26, p=.79). At the Low probability level, there 
was a significant trend, t(80)=1.65, p=0.10, with a greater proportion of hard task choices in the 
ASD group compared to the TDC group (see Figure 3). 
Follow-up Within-group analyses. Within-group t tests for the ASD group compared 
the proportion of hard task choices between Magnitude levels for Self versus Other (see Figure 
2). There was a significant difference between the proportion of hard task choices at the Low 
magnitude level, t(49)=2.37, p=.02, indicating more hard task choices for Self compared to 
Other. There was also a significant difference between the proportion of hard task choices at the 
Large magnitude level, t(49)=4.14, p=.0001, with more hard task choices for Self compared to 
Other. Lastly, at the Medium magnitude level there was a significant trend, t(49)=1.66, p=.10, 
with greater proportion of hard task choices for Self compared to Other. Within-group t tests for 
the ASD group comparing the proportion of hard task choices between Probability levels for Self 
versus Other (see Figure 3) revealed a significant difference between the proportion of hard task 
choices at the Low probability level, t(49)=2.82, p=.007, indicating more hard task choices for 
Self compared to Other. There was also a significant difference between the proportion of hard 
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task choices at the Medium probability level, t(49)=2.84, p=.007, with more hard task choices for 
Self compared to Other. Lastly, at the High probability level there was a significant difference 
between the proportion of hard task choices, t(49)=3.09, p=.003, with more hard task choices for 
Self compared to Other. 
Within-groups t tests for the TDC group compared the proportion of hard task choices 
across Magnitude levels for Self versus Other (see Figure 2). There was a significant difference 
between the proportion of hard task choices at the Low magnitude level, t(49)=3.76, p=.0007, 
indicating more hard task choices for Self compared to Other. There was also a significant 
difference between the proportion of hard task choices at the Medium magnitude level, 
t(49)=5.00, p<.0001, with more hard task choices for Self compared to Other. Lastly, at the 
Large magnitude level there was a significant difference between the proportion of hard task 
choices, t(49)=2.95, p=.006, with more hard task choices for Self compared to Other. Within-
groups t tests for the TDC group comparing the proportion of hard task choices across 
Probability levels for Self versus Other (see Figure 3) revealed a significant difference between 
the proportion of hard task choices at the Low probability level, t(49)=4.91, p<.0001, indicating 
more hard task choices for Self compared to Other. There was also a significant difference 
between the proportion of hard task choices at the Medium probability level, t(49)=3.69, 
p=.0008, with more hard task choices for Self compared to Other. Lastly, at the High probability 
level there was a significant difference between the proportion of hard task choices, t(49)=3.64, 
p=.001, with more hard task choices for Self compared to Other. 
Within-group t tests in the ASD group also compared the proportion of hard task choices 
across Magnitude levels for Self (see Figure 2). There was a significant difference between the 
proportion of hard task choices at the Small magnitude and the proportion of hard task choices at 
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the Medium magnitude, t(49)=4.75, p<.0001, indicating more hard task choices at the Medium 
magnitude level. There was also a significant difference between the proportion of hard task 
choices at the Medium magnitude and the proportion of hard task choices at the Large 
magnitude, t(49)=3.42, p=.001, with more hard task choices at the Large magnitude level. 
Within-group t tests in the ASD group comparing the proportion of hard task choices across 
Probability levels for Self (see Figure 3) revealed a significant difference between the proportion 
of hard task choices at the Low probability and the proportion of hard task choices at the 
Medium probability, t(49)=5.28, p<.0001, indicating more hard task choices at the Medium 
probability level. There was also a significant difference between the proportion of hard task 
choices at the Medium probability and the proportion of hard task choices at the High 
probability, t(49)=2.66, p=.01, with more hard task choices at the High probability level.  
Within-group t tests for the ASD group also compared the proportion of hard task choices 
within Magnitude levels for Other (see Figure 2). There was a significant difference between the 
proportion of hard task choices at the Small magnitude and the proportion of hard task choices at 
the Medium magnitude, t(49)=4.86, p<.0001, indicating more hard task choices at the Medium 
magnitude level. There was no significant difference between the proportion of hard task choices 
at the Medium magnitude and the proportion of hard task choices at the Large magnitude, 
t(49)=0.26, p=.80. Within-group t tests for the ASD group comparing the proportion of hard task 
choices within Probability levels for Other (see Figure 3) revealed a significant difference 
between the proportion of hard task choices at the Low probability and the proportion of hard 
task choices at the Medium probability, t(49)=5.16, p<.0001, indicating more hard task choices 
at the Medium probability level. There was also a significant difference between the proportion 
22 
 
of hard task choices at the Medium probability and the proportion of hard task choices at the 
High probability, t(49)=3.17, p=.003, with more hard task choices at the High probability level.  
Within-group t tests for the TDC group also compared the proportion of hard task choices 
within Magnitude levels for Self (see Figure 2). There was a significant difference between the 
proportion of hard task choices at the Small magnitude and the proportion of hard task choices at 
the Medium magnitude, t(31)=5.43, p<.0001, indicating more hard task choices at the Medium 
magnitude level. There was no significant difference between the proportion of hard task choices 
at the Medium magnitude and the proportion of hard task choices at the Large magnitude, 
t(31)=0.81, p=.42. Within-group t tests for the TDC group comparing the proportion of hard task 
choices within Probability levels for Self (see Figure 3) revealed a significant difference between 
the proportion of hard task choices at the Low probability and the proportion of hard task choices 
at the Medium probability, t(31)=5.25, p<.0001, indicating more hard task choices at the 
Medium probability level. There was also a significant difference between the proportion of hard 
task choices at the Medium probability and the proportion of hard task choices at the High 
probability, t(31)=4.92, p<.0001, with more hard task choices at the High probability level.  
Within-group t tests for the TDC group also compared the proportion of hard task choices 
within Magnitude levels for Other (see Figure 2). There was a significant difference between the 
proportion of hard task choices at the Small magnitude and the proportion of hard task choices at 
the Medium magnitude, t(31)=6.01, p<.0001, indicating more hard task choices at the Medium 
magnitude level. There was a significant difference between the proportion of hard task choices 
at the Medium magnitude and the proportion of hard task choices at the Large magnitude, 
t(31)=4.23, p=.0002, with more hard task choices at the High probability level. Within-group t 
tests for the TDC group comparing the proportion of hard task choices within Probability levels 
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for Other (see Figure 3) revealed a significant difference between the proportion of hard task 
choices at the Low probability and the proportion of hard task choices at the Medium probability, 
t(31)=5.69, p<.0001, indicating more hard task choices at the Medium probability level. There 
was also a significant difference between the proportion of hard task choices at the Medium 
probability and the proportion of hard task choices at the High probability, t(31)=4.11, p=.0003, 
with more hard task choices at the High probability level.  
Correlational Analyses 
Correlations explored the relationship between EEfRT performance and ASD symptoms 
as well as affective and reward sensitivities in the ASD group (see Table 4). Correlations were 
analyzed separately for reward magnitude and reward probability for the Self and Other 
conditions. 
EEfRT Self Condition. The proportion of hard task choices selected for Small, Medium, 
and Large magnitudes were positively correlated with the TEPS consummatory subscale score 
(r(50)=.35, p=0.01, r(50)=.29, p=.04, and r(50)=.29, p=.04, respectively), with increasing levels 
of consummatory pleasure associated with an increased proportion of hard task selection (see 
Figure 4). There was also a negative correlation between hard task choices for the Medium 
magnitude and the BIS, r(50)=-.36, p=.01, with increasing levels of behavioral inhibition 
associated with a decreased proportion of hard task selection. The proportion of hard task 
choices selected for Low and High probability were positively correlated with the TEPS 
consummatory subscale score (r(50)=.32, p=0.025 and r(50)=.39, p=.005, respectively), with 
increasing levels of consummatory pleasure associated with an increased proportion of hard task 
selection (see Figure 5).  
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EEfRT Other Condition. The proportion of hard task choices selected for Small, 
Medium, and Large magnitudes were positively correlated with the TEPS consummatory 
subscale score (r(50)=.41, p=0.004, r(50)=.43, p=0.002, and r(50)=.39, p=.005, respectively), 
with increasing levels of consummatory pleasure associated with an increased proportion of hard 
task selection (see Figure 6).  The proportion of hard task choices selected for Low, Medium, 
and High probability were positively correlated with the TEPS consummatory subscale score 
(r(50)=.40, p=0.004, r(50)=.382, p=0.007, and r(50)=.41, p=.003, respectively), with increasing 
levels of consummatory pleasure associated with an increased proportion of hard task selection 
(see Figure 7). There was also a negative correlation between hard task choices for Medium 
probability and the BIS, r(50)=-.28, p=.05, with increasing levels of behavioral inhibition 
associated with a decreased proportion of hard task selection. Lastly, there was a positive 
relationship between ToM scores and the proportion of hard task choices for Medium 
probability, r(14)=.54, p=.05, with better ToM performance associated with an increased 
proportion of hard task selection.  
Discussion 
The goals of the present study were to (1) extend the effort-based decision-making 
findings of Damiano et al. (2012) from adults with ASD to an adolescent sample; (2) investigate 
effort-based decision-making in social and nonsocial contexts in ASD; and (3) initially explore 
relations between effort-based decision-making and core autism symptoms as well as affective 
functioning and reward sensitivity in ASD. In line with Damiano et al. (2012), I hypothesized 
that, in the Self (nonsocial) condition, adolescents with ASD would select the hard task option 
more often than would the TDC group. However, for the Other (social) condition, I hypothesized 
that the ASD group would select fewer hard task choices relative to the TDC group. I further 
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hypothesized that differences in the proportion of hard task choices would not be accounted for 
by ToM deficits. Lastly, hypotheses predicted that patterns of effort-based decision-making in 
the ASD group would predict more severe core autism symptoms and more severe impairments 
in associated measures of affective functioning and reward sensitivity. 
Contrary to hypotheses and to the findings of Damiano et al. (2012) in adults with ASD, 
in the Self condition, adolescents with ASD did not demonstrate a pattern of overall more hard 
task choices that were insensitive to reward magnitude and probability. In fact, results suggested 
more nuanced patterns of relations between magnitude, probability, and effort-based decisions 
for Self and Others in adolescents with ASD. Specifically, there was a Condition × Group × 
Magnitude interaction that reflected decreased sensitivity to reward magnitude in the ASD when 
earning rewards for others. Additionally, the significant Condition × Group interaction suggested 
that groups differed in responses for Self and Other. More specifically, when working to earn 
rewards for themselves, adolescents with ASD did not differ in their willingness to expend effort 
across reward probabilities and magnitudes compared to TDC adolescents; however, when 
earning rewards for others, the ASD group made significantly more hard task choices relative to 
the TDC group.  
The current results indicate that ASD is characterized by decreased sensitivity to reward 
magnitude information when making effort-based decisions specifically in the context of earning 
rewards for others. This difference is notable given the extensive literature on altered decision-
making in ASD that has found that individuals with ASD are less likely to use task information 
and less likely to consider the context when making choices about rewards compared to TDCs 
(De Martino, Harrison, Knafo, Bird, & Dolan, 2008; Johnson, Yechiam, Murphy, Queller, & 
Stout, 2006). The present study extends this line of research by demonstrating that adolescents 
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with ASD show decreased sensitivity to reward information, specifically reward magnitude, 
when making choices about working to earn rewards for others. In addition, prior research links 
altered effort-based decision-making in adults with ASD to differential cost-benefit gradients in 
the context of monetary rewards (Damiano et al., 2012). Given that the EEfRT was designed to 
measure motivation for reward based on how much effort is exerted to obtain a reward of a given 
reward parameter (Treadway et al., 2009), decreased or increased sensitivities to these reward 
parameters, or atypical cost-benefit gradients, suggests impaired effort-based decision-making. 
Therefore, it is likely that adolescents with ASD also exhibited differential cost-benefit gradients 
in the context of monetary rewards but more specifically in the context of rewards for others. 
Ultimately, this may reflect altered effort-based decision-making, and more broadly, social 
motivation impairments in adolescents with ASD. 
In line with these findings, clinical observations of individuals with ASD also suggest 
social motivation impairments, as this population often shows heightened motivation for 
nonsocial rewards and increased motivation to engage in nonsocial activities. This preference for 
nonsocial stimuli biases the individual away from social information and interactions and biases 
them towards nonsocial information (Sasson et al., 2008; Turner-Brown, Lam, Holtzclaw, 
Dichter & Bodfish, 2011). In the context of effort-expenditure in adolescents with ASD, greater 
sensitivity to reward parameters and greater willingness to earn rewards for themselves relative 
to earning rewards for others may be a result of this bias. Additionally, when thinking about 
altered effort-expenditure for rewards for others in the context of social interactions, this reward 
processing deficit may contribute to the social difficulties and lower levels of social competency 
observed in adolescents with ASD (Chevallier, Kohls, et al., 2012; Klin, Jones, Schultz, 
Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002; Orsmond, Krauss, & Seltzer, 2004). Typical development of insight 
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into social relationships involves not only an understanding of others’ mental states but also an 
understanding and interest on one’s one role in the relationship, an interest which increases 
during typical adolescence (Picci & Scherf, 2015). The current findings imply that adolescents 
with ASD may not understand the benefits of helping another person and the role this plays in 
developing and maintaining social relationships, resulting in diminished social motivation. 
Correlational analyses revealed a positive relationship between the consummatory 
pleasure subscale of the TEPS and the proportion of hard task choices across both Self and Other 
conditions in the ASD group. Specifically, high consummatory pleasure, or enjoyment upon 
obtaining a reward (“reward liking”), was associated with a greater proportion of hard task 
choices when earning rewards for themselves. Additionally, adolescents with ASD who had 
greater levels of consummatory pleasure were more willing to expend effort for rewards that they 
would not themselves earn. In line with this finding, reward-circuitry hyperactivation has been 
shown in individuals with ASD during the receipt of nonsocial rewards that are the focus of 
restricted interests in ASDs (e.g. electronics and trains; Dichter et al., 2012). Therefore, the 
present findings indicate atypical responses to the receipt of social as well as nonsocial rewards. 
Limitations  
Characteristics of this study’s participants and methods should be considered when 
interpreting results and considering future research. Groups differed on IQ and gender ratio, 
which impacted the current findings when these were included as covariates. The current study 
also included only high-functioning individuals in the ASD group; therefore, it is not known 
whether findings would generalize to low-functioning individuals with ASD. Additionally, this 
sample was predominantly Caucasian (61%) and future studies should extend this work to 
include other ethnicities given the ethnic disparities in the diagnosis of ASD across ethnicities 
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(Mandell, Ittenbach, Levy, & Pinto-Martin, 2007). Additionally, the majority of individuals in 
the ASD group had a least one comorbidity. This design choice resulted in a sample that is 
representative of how ASD presents in the community (Mazefsky et al., 2012). However, given 
that results differed when participants with comorbidities were excluded, future studies should 
further explore the impact of comorbidities on effort-based decision-making in ASD. Moreover, 
groups did not differ on ToM. Although this is not an unexpected finding (performance on ToM 
tasks has been shown to differ with age, cognitive ability, and general reasoning skills (Scheeren, 
de Rosnay, Koot, & Begeer, 2013)), it limited my ability to assess the impact of ToM deficits on 
effort-based decision-making. Lastly, the present analyses did not correct for multiple 
comparisons in order to more fully explore patterns in the data. As such, results should be 
interpreted with caution until replicated. 
Developmental Considerations 
Findings from this study provide support for adolescence as a period when altered effort-
based decision-making, particularly in the context of earning rewards for others, is observed in 
ASD. While typical adolescents tend to show elevated valuation of and heightened behavioral 
and neural responses to social stimuli and peer interactions as well as increases in other-oriented 
thoughts compared to self-oriented thoughts (Blakemore, 2008; Rilling & Sanfey, 2011; 
Somerville, Jones, & Casey, 2010), adolescents with ASD may experience greater decreases in 
behavioral and neural responses to social rewards and interactions. Picci and Scherf (2015) 
proposed a two-hit model of ASD which posits that genetic and neurodevelopmental disruptions 
(the “first hit”) are further exacerbated by the increasing social demands of adolescence (the 
“second hit”). As a result, developmental trajectories of symptom expression typically worsen 
for individuals with ASD during adolescence, which may in turn increase the risk for social 
29 
 
deficits and social isolation (Picci & Scherf, 2015). Thus, in the context of the present study, due 
to heightened social deficits, adolescents with ASD may not see the social benefit of expending 
effort for another person and as result, may be particularly unmotivated to earn rewards for 
others. Taken together, the present findings advance this growing body of literature by 
suggesting that, for individuals with ASD, adolescence may be an especially vulnerable period of 
development for which deficits in social motivation differ compared to children and adults. 
Clinical Implications 
Results of this study have clinical implications for adolescents with ASD. Individual 
differences in social motivation are associated with treatment efficacy in ASD, such that young 
children with ASD who are passive and less socially motivated are typically less responsive to 
early behavioral interventions than are children who demonstrate greater social interest and 
approach behaviors (Koegel & Mentis, 1985; Sherer & Schreibman, 2005). For those who are 
less socially motivated, successful programs have incorporated the interests of young children 
with ASD into communication or interpersonal interventions to increase prosocial behavioral 
(Dunst, Trivette, & Hamby, 2012). Thus, interventions that capitalize on motivation for 
nonsocial rewards may in fact enhance social motivation in individuals with ASD. However, 
given that developmental trajectories of reward processing are nuanced for those with ASD as 
well as those who are typical developing, it is critical for future studies to compare individuals 
with ASD to TDCs across development in order to better inform treatments. Wolff and Piven 
(2014) recently highlighted the importance and shortage of longitudinal research in 
understanding how ASD develops over the lifespan. They stressed that understanding how the 
disorder unfolds over time can “provide the most insight in to the pathogenesis of autism” (Wolff 
& Piven, 2014, p. 432). By sampling from a large age range, future studies could more 
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accurately pinpoint critical time periods when reward processing in ASD deviates from 
trajectories of typical individuals and therefore, when interventions would be particularly 
effective. 
Conclusions 
In sum, the current findings provide evidence for altered effort-expenditure for rewards 
for other in adolescents with ASD. The ASD group was less influenced by increasing reward 
magnitudes when earning rewards for others, a decreased sensitivity to reward parameters that 
may reflect an inability to see the social benefits of earning rewards for others and ultimately, 
may reveal a deficit in social motivation. As the first study to date to explore effort-based 
decision-making in adolescents and in the context of earning rewards for another person, these 
findings advance the growing body of literature on reward processing deficits in ASD and 
highlight the importance of examining developmental patterns of these deficits. 
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Table 1 
Mean (and Standard Deviation) scores on demographic and clinical measures for the ASD and 
TDC Groups 
 
 ASD (n=50) TDC (n=32) p-value 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD)  
Age 16.02 (2.58) 15.63 (2.95) .53 
Verbal IQ (VIQ) 104.10 (17.17) 111.80 (11.42) .02* 
Performance IQ (PIQ) 101.10 (16.29) 106.10 (10.70) .09 
Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) 102.94 (16.89) 110.38 (11.46) .02* 
Male: Female ratio 22:3 9:7 <.01* 
ADOS SA 11.17 (3.52) NA  
ADOS RRB 3.83 (1.66) NA  
Participant Race    
African-American 4 6  
Caucasian 45 21  
Hispanic 1 2  
Asian American 0 2  
Other 0 1  
Note. ADOS SA = Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, Social Affect domain; ADOS RRB = 
ADOS, Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors domain 
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Table 2  
Assessments administered to different age and diagnostic groups 
 ASD (8-12) ASD (13-17) ASD (18+) TDC (8-12) TDC (13-17) TDC (18+) 
SRS (SR)   X   X 
SRS (CR) X X  X X  
CDI X X  X X  
BDI   X   X 
SPSRQ-SR   X   X 
SPSRQ-CR X X  X X  
TEPS X X X X X X 
BIS/BAS   X   X 
C-BIS/BAS 
(CR) X X  X X  
AES (SR)   X   X 
AES (CR) X X  X X  
PPDS (CR) X X  X X  
ToM X X X X X X 
Note. SRS = Social Responsiveness Scale; CDI = Child Depression Inventory; BDI = Beck Depression 
Inventory; SPSRQ = Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire; TEPS = 
Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale; BIS/BAS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale and Behavioral 
Activation Scale; C-BIS/BAS = Child BIS/BAS; AES = Apathy Evaluation Scale; PPDS = Peterson 
Pubertal Development Scale; SR = Self-report; CR = Caregiver report; ToM = Theory of Mind. 
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Table 3 
Mean (and Standard Deviation) scores for the ASD and TDC Groups 
 
 ASD TDC P-value 
 n Mean (SD) Mean (SD)  
SRS T-score 82 77.36 (9.49) 49.84 (10.29) <.0001* 
CDI 53 51.77 (2.60) 52.91 (2.14) .10 
BDI 29 7.89 (6.54) 4.40 (4.95) .15 
SPSRQ-Reward 79 31.43 (11.23) 30.70 (8.90) .76 
TEPS-Anticipatory 82 42.96 (7.85) 45.84 (6.21) .08 
TEPS-Consummatory 82 32.36 (7.75) 36.44 (7.28) .02* 
BIS 82 15.00 (2.99) 15.75 (2.27) .23 
BAS-Drive 82 9.18 (2.82) 8.78 (2.85) .54 
BAS-Fun Seeking 82 8.80 (2.55) 7.91 (1.97) .10 
BAS-Reward 
Responsiveness 
82 8.10 (2.52) 7.56 (1.66) .29 
AES 79 44.27 (10.13) 57.77 (7.00) <.0001* 
ToM 27 0.71 (0.47) 0.85 (0.38) .43 
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Table 4 
Correlations between the proportion of hard task choices and questionnaire measures in ASD 
Variables  Proportion Hard Task Choices for Self Proportion Hard Task Choices for Other 
  Small Med Large 12% 50% 88% Small Med Large 12% 50% 88% 
 SRS -0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.03 0.09 0.08 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.14 0.07 0.05 
 CDI -0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.33 0.31 0.24 0.20 0.30 0.16 -0.10 0.33 0.31 
 BDI -0.17 0.17 -0.35 -0.22 -0.08 -0.15 -0.23 -0.01 0.05 -0.38 0.20 0.16 
 SPSRQ-R 0.04 -0.18 -0.06 -0.11 -0.22 -0.24 0.02 -0.10 -0.26 -0.20 -0.15 -0.04 
 TEPS-A 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.20 0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.05 -0.06 -0.08 
 TEPS-C  0.35 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.17 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.41 
 BIS -0.11 -0.36 -0.26 -0.24 -0.22 -0.24 -0.14 -0.26 -0.28 -0.15 -0.28 -0.25 
 BAS-D 0.09 0.122 0.05 -0.01 0.18 0.13 0.27 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.24 
 BAS-F 0.05 -0.01 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.19 
 BAS–R -0.12 0.04 -0.02 -0.14 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.09 -0.06 0.12 0.19 
 AES 0.14 0.13 0.21 0.23 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.15 
 ToM 0.48 0.24 0.13 0.33 0.16 0.27 0.31 0.38 0.31 0.28 0.54* 0.11 
*p<.05, **p<.01  
** ** ** ** ** * * ** 
** 
** ** 
* 
* 
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Time: 5.67 
Choosing 
for Self + 
Ready? You completed 
the task! 
You won 
$2.37 
A B C D E F G 
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of a single trial of the “Self vs. Other” modified 
version of the Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task (EEfRT): A) Subjects are told 
whether they are “Choosing for Self” or “Choosing for Other.” B) Subjects see a 1s 
fixation cue. C) Unlimited choice period in which subjects are presented with 
information regarding the reward magnitude of the hard task for that trial, and the 
probability of receiving any reward for that trial. D) One-second “ready” screen. E) 
Subjects make rapid button presses to complete the chosen task for 7s (easy task) or 
21s (hard task). F) Subjects receive feedback on whether they have completed the 
task. G) Subjects receive reward feedback as to whether they received any money 
for that trial. 
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Figure 2. Reward Magnitude for Self and Other. Brackets and asterisks reflect significant 
differences.  
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Figure 3. Reward Probability for Self and Other. Brackets and asterisks reflect significant 
differences.  
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Figure 4. Correlations with TEPS-C and Reward Magnitude for Self. 
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Figure 5. Correlations with TEPS-C and Reward Probability for Self. 
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Figure 6. Correlations with TEPS-C and Reward Magnitude for Other. 
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Figure 7. Correlations with TEPS-C and Reward Probability for Other. 
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES 
Results including IQ as a covariate 
The omnibus model was a 2 (Group: ASD, TDC) × 3 (Magnitude: Small, Medium, 
Large) × 3 (Probability: 12%, 50%, 88%) × 2 (Condition: Self, Other) repeated measures 
ANCOVA controlling for IQ was performed on the percentage of hard task choices. Centrally 
relevant to hypotheses, the Condition × Group × Magnitude interaction remained significant, 
F(2,78)=3.50, p=.04, reflecting that groups differed on the influence of Magnitude in the Self 
and Other conditions, as well as the significant Condition × Group interaction, F(1,79)=4.91, 
p=.03, indicating that groups differed in responses for Self and Other. The significant main 
effect of Condition also remained significant, F(1,79)=4.47, p=.04, reflecting a greater 
percentage of hard task choices in the Self relative to the Other condition across groups. All 
other main effects and interactions were not significant.  
Results including gender as a covariate 
When controlling for gender, results revealed a significant trend for the Condition × 
Group × Magnitude interaction, F(2,78)=2.64, p=.08, as well as the significant trend for the 
Condition × Group interaction, F(1,79)=3.09, p=.08. There was still significant main effect of 
Condition, F(1,79)=8.99, p=.004. In addition, the significant main effects for Magnitude, with 
higher magnitude levels associated with more hard task choices across groups (F(2,78)=10.88, 
p<.0001) and Probability, with higher probability levels associated with more hard task choices 
across groups (F(2,78)=10.94, p<.0001), remained significant. All other main effects and 
interactions were not significant. 
Results including pubertal development as a covariate 
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When analyses controlled for pubertal development (PPDS Total Score), results revealed 
that the Condition × Group × Magnitude interaction remained significant, F(2,52)=4.01, p=.02, 
as well as the significant Magnitude × Group interaction, F(2,52)=3.56, p=.04. There was a 
significant trend for the main effect of Condition, F(1,53)=3.00, p=.09.  All other main effects 
and interactions were not significant. 
Results including ToM as a covariate 
When controlling for ToM, results revealed a main effects for Magnitude, F(2,23)=10.79, 
p=.0005, and a Probability, F(2,23)=6.05, p=.008, remained significant across groups. All other 
main effects and interactions were not significant. 
Results including participants without a comorbid diagnosis 
When analyses excluded participants who had a comorbid diagnosis, there were no 
significant interactions with Group. Only the main effects of Condition (F(1,40)=17.59, 
p<.0001), Magnitude (F(2,39)=28.03, p<.0001), and Probability (F(2,39)= 26.94, p<.0001) 
remained significant.  
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